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FROM MYTH TO FICTION:  
WHY A LEGALIST-CONSTRUCTIVIST RESCUE OF 






The defeat of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters in 2005 and the 
following stalemate of the Lisbon Treaty have sparked a soul-searching process for 
European constitutional scholarship. Among the numerous academic efforts devoted to 
contemplating the future of European constitution, Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner’s 
The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power 
deserves a close look. Everson and Eisner argue for a postconstituent view of European 
constitutionalization, which they call ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’. Departing from the 
myth of the constituent power, they interpret the development of a European constitution 
as a self-creating process by which the ordinary legal system gives itself a set of core 
values and thereby remakes itself into a constitutional order. Moreover, against the 
criticisms of juridification, they defend this lawyer-centred process of European 
constitutionalization as incorporating politics into the daily operation of the legal 
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system. Engaging with Everson and Eisner’s argumentation, I argue that their account 
of European constitutional development does not so much put out a realist theory of the 
EU constitutionalization as sets out a realist academic lawyering for the next round of 
European constitutional politics, which is shared among European constitutional 
scholars. Contrasting this community-based legal profession in Europe with the 
situation of epistemic pluralism in American jurisprudence, in this article I observe that 
a lawyer-centred European constitutional theory as Everson and Eisner’s book 
illustrates is premised on an inherited consensus that has held a European legal 
profession together. However, this lawyer-centred account of European 
constitutionalization presumes either the projection of a professional community onto a 
Europe-wide civic culture or the self-appointment of legal professionals as the fiduciary 
of the citizenry. Each is a fiction, however. This fictional character of the 
legalist-constructivist strategy to European constitutional politics is the underlying 
cause of the dilemma facing European constitutional ordering.  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................3 
2. DEMYTHIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT: TOWARDS A 
POSTCONSTITUENT CONSTITUTION .......................................................7 
A. AGAINST: EVERSON’S DECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MYTH OF A SOVEREIGN POLITICAL COMMUNITY......................................7 
B. FOR: EVERSON’S LEGALIST-CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIZATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDERING................................................................11 
3. BETWEEN ARGUMENTATION AND FICTION: WELCOME TO THE 
LAWYERS’ DREAM WORLD.....................................................................16 
A. INTERLOCUTING WITH EVERSON: LEGAL REALISM OR REALIST 
LAWYERING IN THE GUISE OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES .................................17 





Since Eric Stein’s groundbreaking work on the legal integration of the European 
Communities1 and Joseph Weiler’s theorization of how a constitution of Europe has 
resulted from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),2 a great many 
publications have been devoted to shedding theoretical light on this constitutional 
avant-gardism in Europe.3  The central concern shared among these works is how to lend 
theoretical support for this European phenomenon: that a constitutional order emerges 
without the making of a constitution.4  However, this legalist-constructivist approach to lay 
theoretical foundations for the development of the European constitutional order has also 
been criticized as exemplary of the tendency towards ‘juridification’ of European 
constitutional politics.5  
In response to the growing distance between European citizens and European 
constitutional development as a result of juridification, there arose calls for ‘politicizing’ the 
process of European constitutional development, aiming to reconnect the European 
constitutional order with European citizens by way of politics.6  Nevertheless, with the 
rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters in consecutive 
                                                
1 E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1-27. 
2 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale LJ  2403-83 (1991). 
3 See e.g. A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2005); R Bray (ed), K Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd 
revd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004). 
4 See generally N. Walker, ‘Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 
OJLS 581-601. 
5 See J. Přibáň, ‘The Juridification of Identity, Its Limitations and the Search of EU Democratic Politics’, 
(2009) 16 Constellations 44-58.  For an introduction to the constructivist position on the EU legal order, see J. 
Shaw, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (1999) 6 J Eur Public Policy 579-97, 579-82. 
6 This resulted in the Laeken Declaration in 2001, leading up to the convening of the Convention on the 
Future of Europe (the Convention) in 2002, and finally to the creation of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe (the Constitutional Treaty) in 2004.  See D Chalmers and A Tomkins, European Union Public 
Law (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 59, 70-73.  See also G. de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of a Constitution for the 
European Union: Europe’s Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?’, (2004) 61 Washington and Lee L 
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referenda in 2005, this political turn seems to have led to nowhere.7  Against this backdrop, 
Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner’s The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and 
Law Beyond Constitutive Power,8 among the numerous scholarly efforts,9 deserves a close 
look. 
Confronted with the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters 
when their book was completed,10 Everson, in collaboration with her co-author and research 
assistant in empirical studies, Eisner, attempts to provide a systematic theory of European 
constitutionalism since its origin in the 1960s until the end of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005.  Perusing the ECJ jurisprudence, she observes that a nonconstituent, legalistic 
version of constitutional ordering and constitutionalism (Rechtsverfassungsrecht) has 
evolved from this judicial process.11  The constitution of Europe driven by the ECJ is based 
on a self-creating process of constitutionalization, which is detached from traditional 
constitution making at a constituent moment.12  She argues that the creation of the 
Constitutional Treaty reflected the ambition of political elites to rebuild the European 
constitutional order on the ‘myth’ of making a constitution through the exercise of the 
constituent (or constitutive) power (pouvoir constituant).13 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rev 555-83. 
7 See Chalmers and Tomkins, (n 6) 73. 
8 M Everson and J Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive 
Power (Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon 2007). 
9 See e.g. M O’Neill, The Struggle for the European Constitution: A Past and Future History (Routledge, 
Oxford 2009); S Baroncelli, C Spagnolo and SL Talani (eds), Back to Masstricht: Obstacles to Constitutional 
Reform within the EU Treaty (1991-2007) (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2008); F 
Laursen (ed), The Rise and Fall of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 2008). 
10 Everson and Eisner, (n 8) 1. 
11 Ibid, 22-26, 214-28. 
12 See U.K. Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations 
between Constituent Power and the Constitution’, (1993) 14 Cardozo L Rev 639-90.  For further reflections 
on the idea of constituent power, see generally M Loughlin and N Walker (eds), The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP, Oxford 2007). 
13 (n 8) 1-2, 10-13. 
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According to Everson, the departure from the pre-Convention path of 
constitutionalization explains why the Constitutional Treaty failed. 14   However, 
overshadowed by the uncertain future of the Lisbon Treaty after the Irish referendum in 
2008, 15  the ‘return to the pre-Convention’ strategy, 16  which centres on judicial 
constitutionalization plus technocratic treaty add-ons,17 seems to face its own challenges 
too.  A critical engagement with Everson’s arguments in this book may shed light on the 
state of the scholarship on European constitutional law and the future of European 
constitutionalism. 
In this review article, I argue that Everson’s legalistic attempt to ‘constitutionalize’ the 
European legal order in the place of the citizenry’s constituent political action illustrates the 
general tendency towards juridification among scholars concerned about the European 
constitutional project, explaining why current strategies of European constitutional politics 
have hit the wall.  I suggest that the faith in the neutrality and autonomy of the law, which 
lies at the core of Everson’s argument, rests on a shared epistemic form that holds the 
European legal professional community together.  To project a legalistic constitutional 
order onto the whole European citizenry, however, would assume the centrality of the legal 
                                                
14 Ibid, 2, 14-19.   
15 The Irish people rejected the Lisbon Treaty and put the reform of the EU institutions in limbo by a 
margin of 53.4 % to 46.6 %.  See S. Lyall and S. Castle, ‘Ireland Derails a Bid to Recast Europe’s Rule’ New 
York Times (New York 14 June 2008) A1.  For a critical reflection on the depoliticized reactions from 
European political leadership to the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, see G. de Búrca, ‘The Lisbon 
Treaty No-Vote: An Irish Problem or a European Problem?’ (2009) University College Dublin Law Research 
Paper No. 03/2009<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359042> accessed 09 June 2009. 
16 Cf. I. Pernice, ‘Salvaging the Constitution for Europe: A Reform Treaty for the EU’ (2007) WHI Paper- 
4/07 (Walter-Hallstein Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Humboldt University) 
<http://www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0407.pdf> accessed 09 June 2009 (noting ‘a more pragmatic 
approach, a purely technocratic improvement of the primary law of the EU by simply amending the existing 
Founding Treaties’ as ‘the ‘European’ way of salvaging the ‘Constitution for Europe’’ after the 2005 defeat of 
the Constitutional Treaty) (emphasis added).  For a critique of the pre-Convention legalistic, technocratic 
process of constitutionalization of the EU, see M. Shapiro, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Politics’, 
(1980) 53 Southern California L Rev 537-42. 
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profession in the political community.  I argue that Everson’s assumption is fictional and 
symptomatic of the attempts of academic lawyers to mobilize in order to lend theoretical 
support to the changing, elusive European constitutional project through innovative 
theories.18  To do justice to the constitutionalization of the European legal order, Everson 
and her colleagues need to tackle squarely the role of constitutional politics in the making of 
a constitutional order, which traditional constitutional dualists aim but fail to address.19  On 
the contrary, as Everson and Eisner’s book shows, the legalist-constructivist strategy of 
European constitutional development fails for its slipping from the dualist myth to the 
community fiction that they hold dear. 
In addition to an Introduction, this article consists of three parts.  Part 2 describes the 
positions that Everson supports and opposes, and argues that her theory suggests a 
postconstituent view of constitutional ordering.  Part 3 constitutes the core of this article.  
An interlocution with Everson shows that her assumption of legal autonomy belies her 
methodological claim that she makes the case for a postconstituent European 
constitutionalism by employing empirical studies and interpreting the ECJ jurisprudence in 
light of critical legal scholarship.  Although I agree with Everson on her diagnosis of the 
integrity of the legal profession in Europe, I argue that her aspirations for the professional 
community as the political foundations of the European constitutional order are only feasible 
in the lawyers’ dream world.  Projecting the legal professional community as one with 
which citizens will come to identify is fictional.  In Part 4, I conclude that Everson’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 See de Búrca, (n 6) 556, 557-58. 
18 Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Thinking About Rethinking’ (2005) 1 Eur Constitutional L Rev 415-16 (expressing a 
sceptical attitude toward the European Commission’s mobilization of legal scholars to extend theoretical 
support to European constitutional development). 
19 I will discuss the position of constitutional dualists later. 
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postconstituent view of constitutional ordering gives short shrift to the central question 
concerning the role of politics in the making of a constitutional order and thus fails to 
breathe new life into the listless European constitutional ordering. 
2. DEMYTHIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT: TOWARDS A 
POSTCONSTITUENT CONSTITUTION 
The traditional view of making a constitution through the exercise of the constituent power 
at an exceptional time lies at the centre of Everson’s critique.  After introducing this object 
of criticism, I proceed to discuss her proposal for a lawyer-centred, constructivist view of 
the making of a constitutional order and explain why her theory points to a postconstituent 
view of the constitution.20 
 
A. Against: Everson’s Deconstruction of the Constitutional Myth of a 
Sovereign Political Community 
The distinction between the constituent power and the constituted power (pouvoir constitué) 
has organized the constitutional tradition established by the American and French 
Revolutions since the late eighteenth century. 21   According to this dualist view of 
constitutional democracy, the legal order under a constitutional regime can be divided into 
two categories: the constitution (including the capital-C constitution and constitutional law 
comprising judicial interpretations and other constitutional practices) 22  and the 
                                                
20 For another postconstituent view of European constitutionalism, see N. Walker, ‘Post-Constituent 
Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union’ in Loughlin and Walker, (n 12). 
21 See Preuss, (n 12). 
22 See WF Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution (Johns Hopkins UP, Baltimore 1993) 1 fn.2, 89-93, 
100-13. 
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nonconstitutional, ordinary body of law.23  The legitimacy of the constitution rests on 
popular sovereignty, which embodies and extends its political will in a constitution through 
the exercise of the constituent power by ‘We the People’.24  As regards the ordinary body 
of law and the power to enforce it following the making of a constitution, they are 
‘constituted’ in nature, as opposed to the constituent power.  The legitimacy of the 
nonconstitutional legal order is a matter of constitutionality: the exercise of the constituted 
powers is legitimate inasmuch as it is in consonance with the constitution.25  Although 
there are variations on how the distinction is to be made between the constitution and the 
nonconstitutional laws under a constitutional order, that distinction is embedded in 
constitutional theories.26  This dualist structure of the legitimacy of constitutional order is 
what Everson calls ‘constitutional settlement’.27  
According to Everson, what is characteristic of this dualist understanding is the 
assumption of closeness in constitutional settlement.28  Under the assumption that the 
legitimacy of the constituted legal system hinges on its constitutionality, the scope and 
content of the constitution must be identifiable through constitutional interpretation so that 
the nonconstitutional laws can be evaluated according to the criteria provided for in the 
constitution.  In this way, notes Everson, this dualist constitutional settlement is 
constructed around the idea of ‘logical perfectionism’.29 
                                                
23 See F.I. Michelman, ‘Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts’ (2003) 66 MLR 1-15, 9. 
24 See Preuss, (n 12).  For further discussion on the concept of constitutional legitimacy attached to ‘We 
the People,’ see M.-S. Kuo, ‘Cutting the Gordian Knot of Legitimacy Theory? An Anatomy of Frank 
Michelman’s Presentist Critique of Constitutional Authorship’ (2009) 7 Int’l J Constitutional L (forthcoming). 
25 See Michelman, (n 23) 8-9. 
26 Ibid.  See also J.M. Balkin, ‘Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution’, 
(2004) 39 Tulsa L Rev 485-509, 486-88. 
27 (n 8) 13-19. 
28 Cf. Ibid 227.  
29 Ibid. 17. 
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However, Everson makes a twofold critique of this dualist constitutional settlement.  
First, she questions the fictional character of the ‘logically coherent (and emotionally 
appealing) institutional edifice’ that has been built around the constitutional settlement.30  
Facing growing social complexity and value pluralism, all attempts to ‘settle’ once and for 
all the politically contested issues of constitutional rights regarding the relationship between 
individuals and the government and that among private individuals through ‘the final act of 
the ‘constituting’ of the polity’ are necessarily ‘reductionist’.31  To maintain the semblance 
of the finality of constitutional settlement, constitutional dualists need to assume an 
inexhaustible source of meaning in the constitutional order to which myriad interpretations 
of constitutional texts can be attributed.  Popular sovereignty, the assumed holder of the 
constituent power, or in Everson’s words, a ‘national constitutional identity’,32 not only 
enables the constitution to function as the constant reference point for the legal system but 
also provides the required comprehensiveness and closeness to the constitutional order.33  
For this reason, constitutions settled on the constituent power of popular sovereignty are 
tantamount to ‘totalizing constitutional myths’.34 
In addition to the flawed presumption of logical perfectionism in the dualist 
constitutional settlement, Everson pins the second prong of her critique on the dissonance 
between the structure of constitutional settlement and the evolution of the European 
constitution.  Siding with her numerous colleagues in European law and constitutionalism, 
Everson holds firm to the proposition that a specific form of constitutionalism for Europe 
                                                
30 Ibid. 16. 
31 Ibid. 214, 16 
32 Ibid. 14. 
33 See also B. Ackerman, ‘2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution’, (2007) 120 
Harvard L Rev 1737-,1812 1756. 
34 Everson and Eisner, (n 8) 10. 
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has materialized in the decades-long process of European integration.35  On this view, 
whether the EU has a constitution is a moot issue.  Instead, the question is how the dualist 
theory of constitutional settlement would account for the development of the European 
constitution.  Corresponding to the theories of constitutionalization, which contend that a 
separate European legal order has not only materialized, overlayering the national legal 
systems of the EU member states, but has also taken on a constitutional character through 
the transformative decisions of the ECJ,36 Everson situates the European constitutional 
order outside the framework of constitutional settlement.37 
On the one hand, in contradiction with traditional international law theories, Everson 
notes that the process of constitutionalization took place beyond the imagination of the 
‘masters’ of the European integration when the member-states signed a series of formative 
treaties of the EU.38  Thus even if, for the sake of argument, the state masters of the EU 
legal order are considered the holders of the Europe-wide constituent power, the existing 
European constitutional order itself cannot be attributed to them.39  On the other hand, 
Everson agrees with sceptics of the idea of the European constitution that a European demos 
is a dream yet to come true.40  Without a demos, the constituent power to make a 
constitution does not exist.  Taken together, the dualist structure of constitutional 
settlement, which Everson associates with traditional constitutional theories, fails to account 
for the development of the existing European constitutional order. 
                                                
35 Ibid. 2. 
36 See Weiler, (n 2).  See also M.P. Maduro, ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: 
Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism’, (2005) 3 Int’l J Constitutional L 332-56. 
37 (n 8) 16-22. 
38 Ibid. 49. 
39 Ibid. 50-51. 
40 Cf. Ibid. 93. 
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B. For: Everson’s Legalist-Constructivist Theorization of the European 
Legal Ordering 
Departing from the dualist structure of constitutional settlement, Everson reinterprets the 
origin, evolution, and prospect of the European constitutional order in light of the notion of 
‘Self-constitutionalizing law’ (Rechtsverfassungsrecht)’.41  At the core of this virtually 
untranslatable concept is the self-creating process by which the ordinary legal system gives 
itself a set of core values and distinguishes among the values emanating from judicial 
decisions in a hierarchical order, remaking itself into a constitutional order.42  This sets 
Everson’s theory of the constitutionalization of the European legal order apart from her 
academic colleagues. 
What is characteristic of Everson’s ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’ is a relationship of 
immanence between law and society.43  Against legal classicism,44 she agrees with the 
critique made by legal realists that it is a legal fiction that the law as a normative system 
stands independently of, but governs, social reality.  Rather, the law must respond to the 
‘real-world’ needs from society.45  However, Everson emphasizes the ‘autonomy’ of the 
legal system as a normative order.46  She not only disputes the critical view that equates 
law with politics but also defends the law against colonization by other disciplines such as 
                                                
41 Everson attributes Rechtsverfassungsrecht to German legal scholar Rudolf Wiethölter.  Ibid. 22-26.  
As for the translation of Rechtsverfassungsrecht, Everson notes, ‘Sadly another phrase that is impossible to 
render properly in English’.  Ibid. 38 n 46.  Nevertheless, after regarding it as ‘the sobriquet,’ she refers to 
Rechtsverfassungsrecht as ‘self-constitutionalising [sic]/ socially constitutive law’.  Ibid. 25. 
42 Ibid. 25-26. 
43 Ibid. 75, 114.  For the relationship of immanence between law and society, see generally G. Pearson and 
M. Salter, ‘Getting Public Law Back into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as Source of Immanent 
Critique’ (1999) 8 J Social and Legal Studies 483-508. 
44 See generally T.C. Grey, ‘Langdell’s Orthodoxy’, (1983) 45 University of Pittsburg L Rev 1-53.  For a 
perceptive comparison between American and German legal classicism, see MW Reimann, ‘Holmes’s 
Common Law and German Legal Science’ in RW Gordon (ed), The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
(Stanford UP, Stanford 1992). 
45 (n 8) 9-12. 
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the social sciences.47  Law is not the mirror of politics or any particular academic 
disciplines.  Law reacts with, but stands above, political actions; legal reasoning concerns 
more than scientific assessments. 
Everson situates the contention between legal classicism and legal realism within the 
dilemma at the heart of Max Weber’s legal sociology: formalism vis-à-vis materialism.  As 
Everson paraphrases, in Weber’s view, adherence to formal rationality in the law results in 
the gap between law and society, undermining the faith in the law, while bringing 
substantive or material rationality to legal reasoning would impair the neutrality and 
autonomy of the legal system, placing legal legitimation in jeopardy.48  Facing this 
seemingly irreconcilable dilemma, Everson notes, Weber finally chose legal formalism over 
legal materialism. 49   Nevertheless, Weber’s choice did not resolve the fundamental 
contention.  Rather, Weber’s formalist view of legal rationality contributed to the 
disconnection of legal norms from real-world facts, exposing the law to the ceaseless attacks 
from legal realists and their successors.50  Bearing Weber’s dilemma and his failed solution 
in mind, Everson emphatically aims to re-establish the legitimacy of the law by bridging the 
gap between the law and social reality and maintaining the legal autonomy at the same time. 
 Borrowing sociological theories of law from Eugen Ehrlich, Herman Heller, and 
Wiethölter among other German-speaking scholars,51 Everson argues that the norm is 
immanent in the dynamics of social relations that call for the legal system to adjudicate.52  
The dynamics of social interaction do not suggest a lawless world that waits for legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Ibid. 12. 
47 Ibid. 41-44. 
48 Ibid. 23, 61-62. 
49 Ibid. 54, 62. 
50 Ibid. 24-25. 
51 Ibid. 22-26, 62. 
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intervention.  Norms that govern behaviour in social relations can be discovered in the 
interactions among social actors.53  From the legal sociological point of view, Weber’s 
dilemma is resolved and the legitimacy of the law is maintained inasmuch as the law 
responds to real-world needs by grounding its called-for answers in the extralegal norms 
forming in the dynamics of interactions among social actors.54 
Seen in this light, the relationship between the legal system and social reality becomes 
immanent.  Moreover, the issue of whether a judicial decision looks formalist or is imbued 
with substantive rationality is beside the point.  What matters is whether the law responds 
effectively to real-world needs.  A legal opinion that is constructed around legal formalism 
may be applaudable if it results in the effective resolution of the social issue that initially 
calls for intervention from the legal system.55  Everson notes that the purpose of the legal 
system is to provide neutral norms to regulate social reality.56  How to ‘formalize’ the 
normative rules derived from extralegal norms immanent in the dynamics of interactions 
among social actors through judicial decisions is different from the process of fact finding in 
laboratorial experiments of natural science or empirical studies of social science.  
Norm-giving by fact finding is legalistic and characteristic of Everson’s treasured reflexive 
legal reasoning.57  Alongside formalism and materialism, ‘reflexivity’ emerges as the third 
paradigm of the law that sits between facts and norms, shining light on the question that 
Weber failed to answer.58 
In addition to her attempt to resolve the formalism vis-à-vis materialism debate, 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 Ibid. 75, 114. 
53 Ibid. 219-20. 
54 Ibid. 25-26. 
55 Ibid. 50-55. 
56 Ibid. 55, 60. 
57 Ibid. 43-44. 
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Everson tries to revolutionize the relationship between revolution and the legal order in 
order to redefine the democratic foundations of the European constitutional order.  Instead 
of considering legal indeterminacy an exception and a challenge to the legal system, she 
welcomes it as the source of progress embedded in the law.59  In contrast to the dualist 
view that revolution creates and stands apart from the constituted legal order, Everson 
embeds revolution in the day-to-day business of the legal order.  She notes that under the 
dualist structure, revolution, which takes place at the exceptional constitutional moment 
outside the constituted order, is liable to degenerate into violence.60  Considering the threat 
of violence in the dualist concept of revolution, she takes legal indeterminacy as the locus of 
legal self-renovation through constructive legal interpretation, thereby internalizing 
revolution into the daily, routine operation of the legal system.61  On this view, revolution 
occurs in the progress that legal profession makes of legal indeterminacy through their 
innovative interpretations.  Progressive legal interpretation takes the place of political 
revolution as the origin of Everson’s ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’.62 
As a result, Everson points out that in the doctrinal toolkit of legal formalism exist 
concepts that can turn legal indeterminacy to the advantage of progressive legal 
interpretation, enabling judicial decisions to take the place of the constituent power as the 
locus of (micro)revolutions.63  By way of characterizing legal indeterminacy as the locus of 
internalized revolution, legal concepts such as proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity 
are no longer considered challenges to the ECJ in the development of the European legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 Ibid. 12, 75. 
59 Ibid. 90. 
60 Ibid. 86, 221, 225. 
61 Ibid. 90-93. 
62 Ibid. 23, 90. 
63 Ibid. 86-87, 93. 
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order.  Rather, principles of proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity are regarded as the 
transformer for legal indeterminacy to function as the midwife of the 
‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’ in the paradigm of reflexive law.64  Specifically, by way of 
fleshing out the legal procedural mechanisms inherent in the principles of proportionality, 
rationality, and subsidiarity with ‘systematic legal consensus’ and ‘deliberative democratic 
experimentalism,’ Everson suggests that the ECJ has not only constitutionalized but also 
given democracy to the European legal order.65  While the constituent power is removed 
from the evolution of European constitutional ordering, through Everson’s theoretical lens, 
European constitutionalism is radicalized as the ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’ in the process of 
lawyerly daily renovation, dissolving the democracy deficit at the heart of the criticism of 
the EU.66 
Taken together, Everson’s ambition is twofold.  In contrast to other scholars who base 
their theorization of the European constitution on the court-centred idea of 
constitutionalization,67 Everson’s notion of ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’ not only provides a 
theoretical account of the evolution of the European constitutional order beyond the dualist 
model but also aims to reconstruct the function of law by rebuilding the link between law 
and society on the concept of reflexivity.  On the other hand, she sets herself apart from 
other legal scholars in the reflexive paradigm by embedding legal reflexivity in the process 
of constitutionalization in the EU.68  In her account of European constitutional ordering, 
legal reflexivity is more than a general proposition of how the law relates to the real world.  
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To assess whether the ECJ jurisprudence corresponds to the paradigm of legal reflexivity, 
Everson revisits the ECJ jurisprudence concerning economic market issues and 
noneconomic, social cases,69 looking in particular at the principle of institutional balance.70  
Instead of straightforwardly equating social responsiveness with democracy as her fellow 
legal reflexivists do,71 she transposes democracy to the legal principles of proportionality, 
rationality, and subsidiarity, and then construes them in light of the notions that refer to 
social responsiveness such as democratic experimentalism.72  By going through the twists 
and turns in the ECJ jurisprudence in these two areas with her constructivist insight, Everson 
maps out the legalistic but democratic process of the constitutionalization of the EU legal 
order under the guidance of legal reflexivity. 
3. BETWEEN ARGUMENTATION AND FICTION: WELCOME TO THE 
LAWYERS’ DREAM WORLD 
While Everson claims to base her theoretical account of the constitutionalization of the 
European legal order on the perceptive inputs from critical legal theory,73 in the last 
analysis her argumentation turns out to be closer to strategic lawyering than theory building.  
Moreover, Everson’s tendency to turn academic argumentation into part of European 
lawyerly politics is characteristic of contemporary legal scholarship on European 
constitutional ordering.  In this Part, I first analyze how Everson’s argumentation figures in 
relation to legal realism and its successor critical legal studies (CLS) to show her inclination 
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71 See Teubner, (n 68). 
72 (n 8) 178-89.  See also M.C. Dorf and C.F. Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ 
(1998) 98 Columbia L Rev 267-473. 
73 Cf. (n 8) i, 46-48. 
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toward strategic lawyering.  I then explore whether this legalist-constructivist academic 
lawyering in relation to European constitutional politics evokes another legal fiction of a 
harmonious, if not homogeneous, legal community.  Resting her theory on a fictional 
community not only undoes that theory but also reveals the weakest point of the 
legalist-constructivist strategy regarding the consolidation of European constitutionalism.    
A. Interlocuting with Everson: Legal Realism or Realist Lawyering in the 
Guise of Empirical Studies 
Everson’s unique approach to European constitutional ordering is reflected in the 
organization of her book.  First, she lays out her thesis and general theory in Introduction 
and Chapter 1.  Then she meticulously compares two contrasting subject matters in the ECJ 
jurisprudence: economic market cases and noneconomic, social cases in Chapter 2.  In 
terms of the doctrinal discrepancy in these two fields, Everson argues that it reflects the 
ECJ’s attempts to strike a balance between its multiple tasks.74  To test this account, in 
Chapter 3 she explains the ECJ’s oscillation as its progressive responses to the real-world 
needs, while in Chapter 4, she, aided by Eisner, switches the focus to an empirical study of 
the legal minds involved.  Based on their structured interviews and questionnaire surveys, 
Everson and Eisner manage to establish that legal professionals tend to take refuge in legal 
formalism in the face of the challenges of legal indeterminacy to the legitimacy of the law.75 
In the second half of the book, Everson begins by focusing on another subject matter in 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence.  In Chapter 5, she examines how, with the EU’s institutional 
                                                
74 In economic market cases, Everson argues that facilitating the establishment of a European internal 
market is the ECJ’s central concern.  In contrast, in the field of noneconomic, social affairs, the ECJ manages 
to control the impact of the expansive economic logic on the fabric of social security in the member states.  
Ibid. 63-77. 
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expansion, the principle of institutional balance comes closer to its domestic sibling, the 
separation of powers principle, the core of which is to protect individual freedom by limiting 
government powers.76  Before concluding in Chapter 7, Everson, again in collaboration 
with Eisner, undertakes an empirical study in Chapter 6 of how legal professionals position 
themselves in relation to the principle of institutional balance.  They note that lawyers and 
judges adopt the language of legal formalism to maintain the separation between law and 
politics.77  Moreover, Everson and Eisner argue that in the guise of formalistic doctrines 
such as the principles of proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity, an innovative 
reconnection between European law and democracy is to be found.78  On this view, the 
ECJ has not only constitutionalized but also laid the democratic foundations for the 
European legal order. 
At first blush, the organization reflects Everson’s asserted approach.  Putting the law 
and judicial decisions to the test of empirical study is expected to unveil the truth of the law 
that has been disguised by legal formalism.79  In addition to their limited samples,80 
however, a closer look indicates that Everson’s approach is not as critical or as realist as she 
claims.  On the contrary, Everson and Eisner replace the veil of legal formalism with their 
own. 
Claiming to substantiate their argument with empirical methodologies such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 Ibid. 105-17. 
76 Ibid. 125-31. 
77 Ibid. 186-90. 
78 Ibid. 178-79. 
79 Ibid. 97-98. 
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questionnaire samples out of the 166 original surveys they sent out.  In addition, all their interviews and 
questionnaire surveys are targeted at British legal professionals.  Ibid. 98.  In their second prong of empirical 
studies, only 17 out of the 200 original questionnaires sent to the members of all the EU institutions and the 
members of the Convention were filled out and returned.  Ibid. 196 n16. 
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questionnaire surveys and interviews,81 Everson and Eisner do not seem to do justice to 
their empirical findings.  For example, at one point where a Commission member stated 
that the principle of institutional balance is political in nature but takes a legal form and ‘the 
law [is seen] as subservient to politics’, 82  they comment ‘[l]aw is not necessarily 
‘subservient’ to politics, or better stated, subservient to any individual political vision’, but 
without offering any counter empirical evidence.83  The meanings of interviewees’ replies 
cannot be revealed without interpretation.  Nevertheless, Everson and Eisner do not take 
these replies as empirical access to the reality of the law but instead treat them as anecdotal 
evidence to illustrate or contrast with their proposition.  They not only selectively place 
emphasis on particular segments of the replies but even go to extremes to argue with and 
challenge the interviewees in their interpretations.84 
What makes their empirical work more awkward is their tendency to conjecture about 
interviewees’ laughter or intonation and then (re)interpret interviewees’ responses in light of 
those attributed meanings.  Take the above-mentioned interview again.  The interview 
recorded by Everson and Eisner is annotated with an emphasis on the interviewee’s ‘laugh’ 
following the conclusion of that interview.85  Proceeding to their interpretation of the 
previous response that ‘law [is seen] as subservient to politics’, they state: ‘Humour is, as 
ever, indicative’.86  Comments of this sort sound more like psychoanalysis than legal 
argument.  To be sure, psychoanalysis of law is no stranger to legal studies.87  The 
                                                
81 Ibid. 98. 
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84 Ibid. 106, 108, 110, 112,113, 114. 
85 Ibid. 164. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Tools in psychoanalysis have long been adopted by legal scholars to analyze legal issues. Psychoanalysis 
of law needs to be undertaken in a scientific, systematic way.  See S.R. Schmeiser, ‘‘No Truth Machine’: 
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problem is that theirs is anecdotal, not systematic. 
Thus, the empirical studies conducted by Everson and Eisner are methodologically 
problematic.  However, in terms of the approach of empirical studies to law, the 
methodological issues are too obvious for Everson and Eisner to overlook.  For example, in 
Chapter 6, they are aware that the poor response rate and the disparity in the responses 
among the EU institutions constitute ‘distorting factors’ for their findings and inferences.88  
Thus, to make sense of the apparent methodological distortion, it is necessary to look into 
how they approach their issues. 
Everson places ‘critical legal scholarship’ front and centre in her methodology.89  
Corresponding to her claimed inspiration from critical legal scholarship, Everson draws 
attention to the use of empirical studies.90  As the development of legal realism in 
American legal scholarship indicates, the postclassical concept of law may either be 
reconceived on the basis of social sciences or be understood as part of politics.91  On the 
one hand, the law and economics movement takes up the mantle of the strand of social 
sciences in the postrealist jurisprudence.92  On the other, CLS politicizes the legal system 
much further than legal realists originally thought.93  Seen in this light, if we take her word 
for it, Everson seems to locate herself in the social-sciences strand of the postrealist 
counterrevolution after the fall of legal classicism. 
However, she expressly distances herself from this camp, defending the law against 
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88 (n 8) 163. 
89 Ibid. i. 
90 Ibid. 98-99. 
91 See also AT Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Falling Ideals of the Legal Profession (Yale UP, New Haven 
1993) 166-70.  See also G Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End 
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92 See Minda, (n 91) 83-105. 
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attempted colonization by the social sciences.94  On the other hand, judging from her most 
frequently-invoked American sources of authority, Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger, 
when she makes statements about critical legal scholarship,95 Everson appears closer to the 
political strand of postrealist jurisprudence.  Unlike the ‘crits’, however, she disputes the 
tendency to politicize the law.96  Instead, her claim of critical legal scholarship is based 
mainly on the Continental tradition of legal sociology.  While there are variegated strands 
of thought in the tradition of legal sociology in Europe,97 Everson turns to the idea of 
reflexivity, which can be traced to Eugen Ehrlich in the early twentieth century.98 
Notably, while it is one thing to claim that the law should be embedded in social 
reality, it is another to establish and articulate how the law and social reality are actually 
related.  What the reflexive law paradigm in the Continental tradition of legal sociology has 
accomplished is to set out the former position against the backdrop of legal formalism and 
the free law movement (Freirecht). 99   It is in the latter dimension, however, that 
Continental legal sociologists fall far short.100  Lacking empirical evidence to show how 
the law is actually embedded in the dynamics of the interaction among social actors, 
legal-sociological theories of reflexivity tend to make general, abstract claims, leaving 
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reflexive law as much detached from the actual world as legal formalism does.101 
Rooted in the Continental tradition of legal sociology, which is characteristic of its 
theory-oriented approach and abstract style, Everson and Eisner do not base their theoretical 
proposition on empirical evidence.102  Instead, they first adopt the theoretical model put out 
by reflexivists and then read the ECJ jurisprudence through the lens of legal reflexivity.  
All the attempted empirical works are aimed to complement rather than test their theoretical 
account.  Put bluntly, the ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’ story that Everson narrates in relation to 
the European constitutional order in the book is already completed without Chapters 4 and 6 
where the empirical ‘evidence’ is presented.  Without the support of solid empirical 
evidence, Everson’s claim to unveil the truth of the law with the aid of critical legal 
scholarship turns out to replace empty legal formalism with obscure legal reflexivity. 
She is notably ambitious to present a full, alternative view of how European 
constitutional ordering can be understood, with or without empirical support.  Throughout 
the book, she makes a strong case as to why the political turn in the development of the EU 
constitutional order after the Convention is flawed as far as the future of European 
constitutional politics is concerned.  Playing with the popular notions of rationality, 
proportionality, subsidiarity, and proceduralism, Everson even aims to dissolve the lingering 
criticism of the democracy deficit concerning the EU.103  Taken together, at the heart of 
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Everson’s work is to reestablish the legalistic path on which the constitutionalization of the 
European legal order used to evolve, resisting the call for a political refounding of the 
European constitutional order. 
This legalistic attitude toward European constitutional development and politics is not 
particular to Everson.  Rather, it is characteristic of a broad trend in legal scholarship on 
European constitutional law.104  The constitutionalization of the European legal order is a 
collaboration of legal professionals.105  On the one hand, the ECJ judges carved the 
European legal order out from international law as well as from national legal systems of the 
member states through its series of landmark decisions.106  On the other hand, academic 
lawyers jump to lend theoretical support to their colleagues in the Luxembourg court, laying 
the grounds of legitimacy for the unique legal order emerging in Europe after the dark days 
in the wake of WWII.107 
This tendency towards juridification in the legal scholarship on European law and its 
constitutional development is strengthened and consolidated by the similar expert-minded 
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Commission, which has distributed significant research funds to legal scholars.108  The 
long-term effect of this collaboration between technocracy and academia remains to be 
further assessed.  However, it is evident that with the constantly changing politics of 
European constitutional development, legal scholars seem to be on call and ready to lend 
theoretical support to the arcane, chameleon-like European constitutional politics.109  This 
explains the changes in the attitude of European legal scholars toward the Constitutional 
Treaty.  Rooted in the pre-Convention legalistic path, they had held a cautious attitude 
toward the draft Constitutional Treaty before French and Dutch voters went to the voting 
booths.110  In contrast, once the negative results were announced in France and the 
Netherlands, they cast critical eyes on the strategic choice of unifying the sporadic European 
constitutional laws into a single ‘constitutional’ document.111 
It is true that theory and practice are related to and nurture each other.112  It is 
anachronistic naiveté to maintain the separation between academics and politics.113  Still, in 
terms of the intertwinement of legal scholars and constitutional politics in relation to the 
evolution of European constitutionalism, many theoretical discourses on European 
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constitutional ordering have become indistinguishable from advocates’ rhetoric, which is 
aimed to make their case in the choices regarding European constitutional policies.114  This 
is true of Everson’s ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’ story of European constitutional law.  In 
sum, Everson does not so much put out a new theory of the EU constitutionalization on the 
mould of legal realism and its critical successors as sets out a realist lawyering on the 
choices ahead of the coming of the next round of European constitutional politics in the 
guise of empirical studies.      
B. Making Sense of Everson’s Position: Living in the ‘Community’ 
In addition to her inclination toward the European tradition of legal sociology, what 
characterizes Everson’s theoretical position is her assumption of the neutrality and 
autonomy of the legal system.115  Through her lens of assumed legal neutrality, she 
naturally gives the benefit of the doubt to the ECJ, which, as a judiciary, is regarded as the 
embodiment of the neutrality of the legal system, if all legal grammars are followed.  
Instead of making sense of the ECJ jurisprudence in light of European politics, she interprets 
the constitutional politics of the EU in accordance with the ECJ’s doctrinal oscillation.  As 
a result, the assumption of legal neutrality contributes to Everson’s centring on the ECJ in 
her theory, illustrating a tendency of academics involved in the debates on European 
constitutional politics. 116   This reveals not only a fundamental difference in legal 
scholarship and in the legal profession as between Europe and the United States but also the 
limits of the legalistic approach to European constitutional development. 
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While the free law movement has been regarded as the European counterpart to 
American legal realism as well as the subsequent CLS movement,117 it did not shake the 
centuries-old European legal tradition.118  This tradition is not only about a mentality 
towards a definitive, correct answer to the law119 but also related to the proposition that the 
tool to find that definitive, correct answer lies in the traditional legal methodology.  What 
characterizes the epistemic foundations of the European legal tradition is the belief that 
through dogmatic legal pedagogy, the legal texts can be illuminated, leading to the 
emergence of the correct answer.120 
This centuries-old tradition has seen challenges but persists.121  The post-Revolution 
reaction to issues regarding legal interpretation and judicial discretion in France is a case in 
point.  Judges of the parlements were criticized for abusing judicial discretion by inserting 
their political positions into ambiguous legal texts.122  In response, on the one hand, laws 
were made more specific to minimize the chances of judicial discretion.  The result was the 
French Civil Code.123  With a longstanding belief in the distinction between lawmaking 
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and lawapplying,124 for the Continental legal tradition, the threat to the rule of law came 
from lawapplying, not lawmaking.125  The politicization of the law by means of discretion 
could be avoided by improved skills in legislation such as ‘codification’.126  On the other 
hand, judges were commanded to follow formal syllogistic legal reasoning in order to 
guarantee that the law would not be distorted.127  Given a strong belief in the distinction 
between lawmaking and lawapplying, the problem of the politicization of law has been 
confined to lawapplying, while lawmaking has been regarded as the expression of sovereign 
will, which is legitimately political or rather politicized.128 
The conceptual framework of the political and epistemic foundations of the European 
legal tradition as illustrated in the post-Revolution French debate on the role of the judiciary 
helps to understand how the European legal profession has dissolved the subsequent 
challenges to the European legal tradition, including the existential challenge to European 
law during the Nazi era.129  Although legal formalism has been criticized for paving the 
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way for the takeover of power by Nazis in Germany,130 the practice of the purposive 
interpretation of the law in accordance with the Führer’s will by Nazi judges has been 
diagnosed as the pathology of the European legal tradition.131  Thus, responses to that 
darker legacy in Europe have been focused on the return to the centuries-old tradition of the 
European legal profession.132  Restoring legal neutrality in lawapplying is the antidote to 
the Nazi pathology.133  To European lawyers, the legal tradition is the solution, not the 
problem. 
In contrast, the reaction to legal classicism following the Lochner era in the United 
States was revolutionary.134  On the one hand, the political foundations of the legal system, 
the Supreme Court in particular, were called into question.  The Lochner Court and its legal 
formalism were criticized for implanting capitalist economic ideology into American 
constitutional jurisprudence.135  As a consequence, the Supreme Court barely survived with 
its (in)famous ‘switch in time’ under the threat of court packing.136 
There is no need to repeat this all-too-familiar history.  What is noticeable in the 
reactions to the political judging of the Lochner Court is the political understanding of the 
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law.  As indicated above, unlike its European counterpart, the American legal culture, 
rooted in the common law tradition, does not maintain a clear distinction between 
lawmaking and lawapplying. 137   Moreover, Congress in the American constitutional 
structure does not have the sovereign status enjoyed by its European counterparts in their 
legal tradition.  Sovereignty is embodied in the Constitution, not statutory legislation.138  
Thus, the question of the politicization of the law is not restricted to the judiciary.  With the 
unmasking of the legal neutrality traditionally maintained by formalistic judging, formalistic 
legal reasoning is regarded as an accomplice to the political hijacking of the law.139  Both 
the political and epistemic foundations of legal classicism in American jurisprudence were 
undermined in the realist reaction to the Lochner era and its formalist accomplices.140 
As noted above, facing the postrealist crisis of American legal scholarship, two 
reactions arose.  One was to play along with the political hijacking of the legal system.  
On this view, the problem is not the politicization of the law but instead its bad 
politicization.  This resulted in the CLS movement.141  The other postrealist reaction to 
the politicization of the law was to confront the problem head-on.  The law should not be 
captured by politics.  To save the law from political hijacking is to depoliticize the law.  
This echoes the post-WWII reaction to the Nazi jurisprudence in Europe.142  However, 
what sets the post-WWII development of American jurisprudence apart from its European 
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counterpart was that the traditional epistemic foundations also collapsed in the American 
realist reaction to legal classicism.  While restoring the legal tradition constituted the 
backbone of Europe’s recovery from the Nazi blow to the rule of law, social sciences and 
other related academic disciplines were called to lay new foundations for the post-WWII 
jurisprudence in the United States.143 
Taking into account this divergence in the reactions to the new challenges from social 
transformation between American jurisprudence and the European legal tradition helps to 
make sense of the form of Everson’s academic lawyering in relation to European 
constitutional politics.  As noted above, despite her criticism of legal formalism, Everson 
makes a strong assumption about legal neutrality and autonomy in her academic 
reconstruction of European constitutional law.144  This belief in legal neutrality maintains 
continuity with the centuries-old European legal tradition.  Moreover, the assumption of 
legal autonomy evolves into a mentality that rejects the colonization by or pollution from 
other academic disciplines.  Law is not only a neutral normative system but also an 
independent discipline. 145   For the traditional lawyers, of whom Everson is critical, 
traditional tools in legal analysis are the epistemic assurance of legal neutrality and 
autonomy. 
However, Everson’s epistemic tools for achieving legal neutrality and autonomy may 
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look trickier.  On the one hand, she distances herself from traditional legal formalists.146  
On the other hand, she also keeps social scientists at arm’s length, despite her claim to use 
empirical studies tools.147  Facing this dilemma, she turns to the idea of legal reflexivity 
with an eye to maintaining legal neutrality and autonomy by bridging the gap between the 
law and real-world issues.148  Yet, once the label of legal reflexivity is replaced with legal 
formalism, the argumentative styles are hardly distinguishable.  Without actually 
demonstrating how the law relates reflexively to the real world with empirical evidence, 
legal reflexivity simply glosses over the black hole that critics of traditional legal thinking 
have identified with the gap between the major premise and the minor premise in traditional 
syllogistic legal reasoning.149 
Thus, underneath the difference between Everson and her traditional European 
colleagues is a shared epistemic form, which underpins their common belief in legal 
neutrality and autonomy.  In contrast, what is characteristic of contemporary American 
legal scholarship and profession is the lack of that form of consensus.  In the famous Fish 
v. Fiss debate on whether the law as a separate and independent discipline died following 
the Lochner era in the United States, Owen Fiss and Stanley Fish centre their arguments on 
the integrity of an interpretive community.  While Fiss contends that law’s independence 
will survive with the consensus that holds the professional community of law together,150 
Fish makes a contrary diagnosis, announcing the death of law simply because of too many 
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communities in the law.151 
Leaving aside the CLS movement that hails the politicization of the law, while there 
have been continued attempts to re-establish legal knowledge outside the traditional legal 
methodology in the postrealist refounding of legal discipline, the social sciences strand that 
attempts to restore the independence of law from politics does not speak with one voice.  It 
turns out that lawyers, academics as well as practioners, are faced with competing claims to 
truth.152  ‘Law and…movements’ speak to the epistemic pluralism in American law.153 
Taken as whole, in a legal culture such as the United States in which the consensus that 
holds a legal epistemic community together has disintegrated, it is hard to identify a clear, 
agreed-upon way to legal knowledge.  On the contrary, in Europe, as Everson and Eisner’s 
book shows, even in different garbs, European legal professionals remain united on a form 
of consensus rooted in the culture of a professional community.154  In sum, Everson’s 
legalist-constructivist theory of European constitutional development not only suggests that 
her theory remains rooted in the path of constitutionalization set out in the Community era 
of European integration but also characterizes the professional community of law, which she 
exemplifies well. 
What is more, the fact that Everson’s theory, in conceiving the constitutional order in 
Europe, is premised on the professional community also reveals the limits of this legalistic 
approach to European constitutionalism.  Whether attempts to repoliticize European 
constitutional development can deliver on the promise that legal elites fail to fulfil with their 
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theories and academic lawyering remains to be seen.155  Nevertheless, it is not difficult to 
figure out how wide the gap between the professional community and the European 
citizenry is.  As Everson emphasizes, the negation of the Constitutional Treaty in French 
and Dutch referenda was a popular no-confidence vote on European political elites.156  
However, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty cannot be considered a reaction only to 
political elites.  Rather, the creation of the Constitutional Treaty itself was a response to the 
detachment of European citizens from the entire pre-Convention constitutional order.157  
The defeat of the Constitutional Treaty reflects the failure of the responsive strategy as a 
whole. 
Thus, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty is anything but an affirmation of the 
pre-Convention constitutional order.  Rather, it reveals the naiveté of the constitutional 
symbolism that the Convention adopted in response to a deep challenge to the European 
constitutional order.158  The inadequacy of Everson’s partial diagnosis of the fate of the 
Constitutional Treaty is betrayed in the current stalemate of the Lisbon Treaty, which is a 
return to the pre-Convention strategy.159  If the indifference and alienation of the European 
citizenry in relation to the status quo of the European constitutional order is the main issue 
facing European constitutionalism, it also reveals the gap between legal elites and citizens in 
                                                
155 See U. Haltern, ‘On Finality’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), (n 3). 
156 (n 8) 1-2. 
157 See de Búrca, (n 6) 561-63, 571-73 (discussing the gap between the motives and the reality of the 
creation of the Constitutional Treaty as a response to the legitimacy deficit of the EU).  See also de Búrca, (n 
111) at 205-06. 
158 See Haltern, (n 155). But see J Přibáň, Legal Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot 2007) (discussing and defending legal symbolism especially in the domain of 
constitutional law). 
159 See Pernice, (n 16).  Cf de Búrca, (n 15) (noting the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty as ‘the latest 
manifestation of an ongoing and profoundly challenging popular legitimacy crisis experienced by the EU since 
the time of the Maastricht Treaty’). 
 34 
Europe.160 
As Everson and Eisner’s book illustrates, the legalistic view of European constitutional 
development is premised on a professional community.  To generalize this legalistic view 
of constitutionalism as a popularly held constitutional order suggests either the projection of 
a professional community onto a Europe-wide civic culture or the self-appointment of legal 
professionals as the fiduciary of the citizenry.161  Each is a fiction, however.  This 
fictional character of the legalist-constructivist strategy to European constitutional politics is 
the underlying cause of the dilemma facing European constitutional ordering. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between law and politics is the Gordian knot of legal theory and 
constitutional scholarship.  Constitutional dualism takes its place among other numerous 
attempts to put law and politics in their places.162   As Everson and Eisner’s book 
meticulously shows, constitutional dualism is flawed by locating politics outside the 
boundary of law.163  However, they do not ultimately do a better job than their dualist 
opponents.  They give short shrift to the role of politics in the process of constitutional 
ordering, which constitutional dualists aim but fail to address. 
Critically engaging with constitutional dualism that maintains a distinction between the 
constituent and the constituted powers, Everson argues that the history of the 
constitutionalization of the European legal order suggests an alternative, postconstituent 
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view of constitutional ordering.  She maintains that as the EU model exemplifies, the 
process of constitutionalization takes place in the daily, routine operation of the legal 
system, blurring the distinction between the constituent and the constituted.  Noticeably, 
the legal profession occupies centre stage in this postconstituent view of European 
constitutional ordering.  Moreover, as I have argued, Everson’s theory is built on a 
longstanding European legal tradition, at the core of which lies the belief in legal autonomy 
and the instrumental role that traditional legal methodology plays in achieving that goal.  
This requires a form of consensus, which not only sustains a professional community of 
European jurists but also lays the common epistemic grounds for the belief in legal 
autonomy.  ‘Community’ is the cornerstone of Everson’s theoretical cathedral. 
Everson is right to point out that unlike constitutional dualism, politics is constantly 
involved in the process of constitutional (re)ordering.  However, in establishing her 
legalist-constructivist notion of ‘Rechtsverfassungsrecht’, Everson does not tell her citizen 
readers how politics, which involves not only politicians, professional groups, but also the 
citizens at large, has actually played out in the process of European constitutionalization.  
Instead, as I have noted, she fixes her eyes on the legal minds without much of the empirical 
support that she promises.  At best, she points out that legal indeterminacy provides an 
interface between law and politics and portrays the role of academic lawyering in the 
making of a European constitutional order.  Still, she does not provide a full account of 
constitutional politics in a postconstituent light, leaving the dynamics of politics 
unaddressed.  To present a postconstituent concept of constitutional ordering as a 
convincing alternative to traditional theories regarding the relationship between law and 
politics, Everson needs to tackle squarely the dynamics of politics in shaping legal 
interpretations and in filling the holes inherent in legal indeterminacy. 
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Moreover, as recent constitutional scholarship has suggested, bringing politics back in 
dissolves the dualist myth that sustains the strict separation of the constituent power from 
the constituted order.164  Nevertheless, this does not mean that the entirety of everyday 
activities play out equally in the making of constitutional ordering, although no activity in 
our everyday life can escape the influence of politics.165  Without dealing with this more 
subtle distinction than the traditional dualist model indicates, Everson jumps from a 
theorization of academic lawyering in relation to European law to an assertion of European 
constitutional politics, picturing a self-governing citizenry in the image of a professional 
community. 
In sum, a postconstituent view of constitutional ordering requires a corresponding 
concept of politics that would provide a framework of reference within which the role of 
politics in constitutional ordering can be distinctively assessed.  Unfortunately, this is 
where Everson and Eisner’s book falls far short.  Rather, Everson’s legalistic theory of 
European constitutionalism is premised on the professional community in which she is 
deeply embedded.  Without confronting the widening gap between the legalistic process of 
the constitutionalization of the European legal order and the European citizenry head-on, 
this community-based approach to European constitutionalism is fictional, leaving the root 
cause of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty unaddressed. 
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